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Aerial Zombie and Collective Action without Consensus 
 
Masato Kimura 
 
In Japanese language, there is an expression “reading air” indicating an attitude to 
be obedient to a dominant climate of opinion. And even important political decisions 
regarding the war, Olympic, and the U.S. base have been made under the aerial pressure 
without clear individual leadership and responsibility. 
Chelstrom (2013) calls “zombie action” the collective action case “where neither 
individual has the appropriated intentional state.” Discussing on  the cases of forced 
and  implicit consents as well as negligence, the present paper shall focus on how 
people form a collective decision and action in an authoritarian society, which rejects 
the subjective reductionist approaches of collective action.  
A decision making, which is irreducible to aggregation of individual intentions, is 
not a cultural specific case. Sociologists rather have shared a view that collective or 
social action occurs on the basis of complementarity of expectations among 
contributors, although expectations with regard to each other’s action is not identical 
(Kimura 2018a). Actors expect, presuppose and preoccupy others’ uncertain future 
action reciprocally. And as far as such an expectation is a sort of projects toward others 
mind and uncertain future state of affairs, a collective decision making can fail and 
form a collective negligence. 
An obedient, or authoritarian actors’ strategy of reading air might seem irrational, 
as far as their decision relies not on values of their choices, but attach their mind to the 
air, dominant situation they are involved in. But this is also true to a rational investors 
strategy in the market, which Keynes equate with a beauty contest. 
In the following, the paper firstly introduces Chelstrom’s notion of zombie action 
and examine Japanese “aerial” version of zombie action. And to analyze the fields, 
where an aerial zombie is haunting, I will examine in turn a) the case of obedience, b) 
implicit consent, and c) collective negligence.1 
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1. Aerial zombie: Irreducible collective action 
In his Social Phenomenology, Chelstrom rejects the reductionist approach of 
collective action and yet defends a subjective individualist approach. He claims that 
only individual subjects have the capacity for intrinsic intentionality, but accepts that 
an individual can intend in the first person plural, we intend that we do a collective 
action. This position has been also defended by a series of phenomenologists such as 
Husserl, Schutz and Gurwitsch. And I myself basically agree with his position and 
here give a special focus on the point, Chelstrom raised in the course of his discussion, 
namely the issue of zombie action as a difficulty of the standpoint, which rejects the 
subjective individualism. When a collective intentionality of collective action which is 
irreducible to individuals would be attributed to a sort of mindless or qualia-less 
superagent which has no ground in subjective individual contributors, zombies would 
be haunting our everyday social life. 
In Japanese language, we are familiar to this zombie, naming this enigmatic 
character kuuki, air, and find a zombiac collective action, in which no individual 
member could find an appropriate intentional state and everyone would refuse to take 
responsibility. “Reading air” indicates an attitude to be obedient to a dominant climate 
of opinion and aerial zombies are often made through the majority obedient silence. 
And even important political decisions have been made under this aerial pressure 
without clear individual initiative.  
Let’s take a look at a concrete example. The Governor of Okinawa prefecture had 
a local referendum on 24 February, 2019 on the ongoing construction of a new U.S. 
military base in the Henoko district of Nago. At first, eight conservative municipal 
assemblies rejected the draft budgets for the referendum, insisting that the simple yes 
no question cannot reflect the diverse opinions among voters in the prefecture. The 
conservatives presumably wanted to avoid a further local conflict with the national 
government decision to replace Marine Corps Air Station from the current Futenma 
city by the base being built in Henoko.  
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After their negotiation, the conservative mayors accepted their cities participation 
in the referendum with the condition that the ballot sheet included the third option, 
namely, “neither,” adding to explicit yes and no to the landfill work off Henoko bay in 
accordance with the relocation. By doing so, they tried to collect votes from people 
who honestly didn’t want to have any more US base in their living place――for 70 
percent of all US military bases in the country were concentrated in this archipelago――, 
but might think at the same time that there was no chance at all to reverse the national 
decision and didn’t want to prolong the dispute any longer. 
The third option on the ballot expresses a sort of obedience to the dominancy, 
namely the national government policy to give ground to U.S. military pressures in 
this case. 
An obedient, authoritarian character of the nation is also clearly noticeable in the 
national politics as such. A word sontaku, which means “following unspoken orders,” 
won Japan’s buzzwords of the year 2017 announced by a publisher of Encyclopedia of 
Contemporary Words. In the year, “There [wa]s a crónyism scandal where bureaucrats 
in charge of approving a new school were suspected of acting in line with the 
intentions of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe without being actually ordered to do so.” 
(Osumi 2017) The bureaucrats sold state-owned lands to the two school operators with 
close ties to Abe at a heavily discounted price. 
A critic points out about the scandal and sontaku, “The invoking of implicit 
expectations is a wonderful way to shirk responsibility, ... Superiors can say, I didn’t 
order it, and those lower down can say, I’m following orders, so the buck stops 
nowhere.” (Jefferey Kingston, director of Asian Studies at Temple University, 
interviewed by Sieg 2018) 
Although the language here might seem a sort of rhetoric to give an evasive 
answer and to make an excuse, hiding their malicious intent, let us think about an 
extremely authoritarian society, where most members of the group is so hesitant to 
speak out his or her own opinion and very obedient to the dominant atmosphere. 
Everyone chooses the third option, and after certain results come out, says “I didn't 
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want to do it actually, but I thought all the others except for me wanted to do this, and 
it cannot be helped.” 
A sort of peer pressures were in fact so strong also among the political leaders 
who claimed that “it cannot be helped” to choose Zaha Hadid’s expensive design of 
the Olympic stadium (New National Stadium Project Process Investigation Panel 
2015: 59) and also even among the military leaders at the war time who decided 
suicide bombing Kamikaze attack during the WWII. Shichihei Yamamoto, an author of 
Study on “Kuuki,” points out that a Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet at 
that time confessed after the defeat, “Suicide attacks make sense in the kuuki, now and 
then.” (Yamamoto 1977: 15) 
Further, a reading-the-air attitude is not limited to these political context, but 
rather very banal in our everyday life, and some authors have argued this sort of 
behavior is rooted in Japanese linguistic structure.  
As is well known, Edward T. Hall discussed in his Beyond Culture (1976) on the 
concept of high and low context cultures and argued that Japan is the ultimate high 
context society, where implicit messages in context are preferred in communication 
and direct expressions tend to be avoided. (Hall 1976: 109ff.) Not a rhetoric of excuse, 
but peer pressures in fact yield a collective decision which no individual member 
personally do not want, and nonetheless follow. “ ‘Air’ is a ghost with a truly immense 
absolute power.”  (Yamamoto 1977: 19). 
 
2. Consent through obedience and coercion 
How come these aerial ghosts appear to us, and why we are ascribing our own 
action to this anonymous faceless zombie, although every one of us is present at 
decision making process, didn’t resist it, and follow it through our own contributive 
action. And how can we cast out the monster? 
As an initial clue to the question, let us review briefly the theory of domination 
proposed by Max Weber. 
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In his Society and Economy, Weber defined domination “as the probability that 
certain specific commands will be obeyed by a given group of persons.” And “every 
genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an 
interest...in obedience,” whether it is “based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance.” 
(Weber 1978: 212) 
And he further describes a correspondent obedient attitude:  
 
“Obedience” will be taken to mean that the action of the person obeying follows in 
essentials such a course that the content of the command may be taken to have 
become the basis of action for its own sake. Furthermore, the fact that it is so taken 
is referable only to the formal obligation, without regard to the actor’s own attitude 
to the value or lack of value of the content of the command as such. (Weber 1978: 
215) 
 
Okinawan citizen in reality expressed their explicit “No” to the national 
government in the end (72% of voters and 37% of all the constitutes opposed). But if 
the majority would have voted on the third criteria of indifference, as the conservatives 
plotted, the case of the ballot in Okinawa would be obviously this Weberian case of 
domination, because it is fair to say that voters on the third option should be deemed to 
have shown “a minimum of voluntary compliance” to the national government decision 
to build a new base.  
What about the abstainees from the ballot in this case, who kept silence? Along 
with the voters, who gave an indecisive answer, they also shall be regarded to have 
practically accepted the “default option,” however reluctant they would be, and given 
the authority a blank check in a sort by their silence.  
So indecision and silence on a vote in this case means “Yes” to the national 
government. 
Weber calls what we call today a shared intention of collective action Einverständnis. 
T. Parsons and the others translated this term as “consensual recognition.” (Weber 1978: 
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LXVIII) However, we have to understand that this Einverständnis consists not only of a 
consensus in the sense of agreement (Vereinbarung) but also imposed consent 
(Oktroyierung).2 
No matter how reluctantly we partake in a collective actions, we cannot escape 
being one of us as the plural subject of the collective action, if we act with “a minimum 
of voluntary compliance.” 
Another example of a coerced collective action is given by Michael Bratman in his 
Faces of Intention. 
 
Suppose that I tell you that unless you join with me in a shared intention to sing 
the duet I am going to blow up your house. (Bratman 1999: 132) 
 
Bratman maintains that I and you in this case come to have certain shared intention, 
namely of singing together, in spite of coercion and hence form a shared intentional 
activity of not cooperative type. 
However, can this be really the case of voluntary consent? Let’s consider the 
question further. 
 
3. Implicit consent to default option 
Thus far, we have identified alleged aerial zombie, at least partly, in obedient 
silent majority’s (or also silent leaders) consents, who “voluntarily” submit themselves 
to the dominant situation and decision making.  
Invisible anima (psyche) of zombie in this case—interestingly anima signifies 
originally a current of air or breath—is certainly dependent upon, if not reducible to, 
silent or silenced person’s minimum voluntary compliance. 
However, when we take a moment here to stop and think how it is rationalized to 
interpret someone’s silence as yes or no in a specific situation. 
In Okinawans ballot case, “default option” was overt, because the national 
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government has already demonstrated their rigid policy to fill in the beautiful Henoko 
bay and build an offshore V-shaped runway. Keeping our silence is essentially counted 
as the absence of objection, i.e. positive to the national policy. 
What about then the parliament decision? When the majority members of the Diet 
keep sleeping and silence on a specific legislative bill or abstain the vote on it, the 
collective come to reject the bill. The default option here is “No” to the proposed 
motion. 
In other situations, this sort of default option setting can be uncertain and 
unstable. 
Let’s have a look at the rape case, which Chelstrom proposed:  
 
More pointedly, take the example of two individuals engaged in sexual 
intercourse… if the intentionality of the subjects is removed, the relation between 
the individuals changes dramatically. Cases where one individual’s intention to 
engage in intercourse with the other is lacking, clearly differentiates rape from 
consensual intercourse. Denying subjective individualism prevents one from 
having the ability to differentiate these cases. The case where neither individual 
has the appropriate intentional state might be called zombie action. (Chelstrom 
2013: 124) 
 
Under the recent #MeToo movement, we have the latest case in point. The 
famous photo reporter Ryuichi Hirokawa, head of the monthly magazine Days Japan, 
was accused of sexual assault on seven women of his former employee. One victim 
confessed, “I felt I had no choice but to listen to him, in a country where I knew no 
one. Hirokawa said to me, ‘For someone like you who does not have much education, 
this is the only way you can survive in journalism,’ and sternly demanded that I stay 
silent about this.” (Tamura 2019: 3) Another victim deplored the power he enjoyed in 
the photojournalism community: “I thought that I would not be able to survive in this 
sector if I was thrown out of DAYS JAPAN.” (The Mainichi, Jan. 20, 2019) 
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Hirokawa first insisted that it was a consensual intercourse, because the women 
didn’t say “No” to his offer.  
An American case appearing in the famous movie “The Accused” based on a true 
story is also known, where a woman played by Jodie Foster was gang raped. But since 
she took drugs and showed seductive behaviors, the district attorney made a plea 
bargain to charges of reckless endangerment. The focal issue there was also whether 
she said clearly “No” to the violators. According to the sexist logic, if a woman 
doesn’t say “No,” she would be regarded to give an implicit consent. 
Think about another society, however, where a sexual activity without explicit 
voluntary consent shall be considered as a sexual assault. This affirmative model is 
called “Yes means Yes” approach, and it has been introduced in the law against rape in 
Sweden and Iceland, last year (2018). The USA, Canada, England and Germany take a 
“No means No” approach, while in Japan, what is worse, the existence of violent 
assault or intimidation to the degree that the victim finds it extremely difficult to resist 
is still required for a charge of rape.  
So not only about rape, there are both cases in which a silence could be 
interpreted as pro and con. In one case, a collective action is more loosely recognized 
in scope and a potential victim party is to be blamed on not saying “No.” In the other 
case, no collective action is recognized and a violator is to be blamed, when the other 
party does not give a consent.  
The difference here is opt-out or opt-in settings in which a blank answer 
respectively has a different value. In the former, we find a so-called “presumed consent” 
as in the organ transplant laws in France, Spain, and the Northern European countries. It 
is solely dependent on social contexts, how the unmarked is to be fairly interpreted. 
And in certain cases, a sort of paternalism is allowed as in rape law protecting a child. 
The argument on this issue is traceable even back to John Locke’s theory of social 
contract and his argument on tacit consent or “acquiescence” to be a member of a 
society. In order to identify someone as a member of certain group, society or state, we 
often presuppose their tacit consent.  
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There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent, which will 
concern our present case. Nobody doubts but an express consent of any man, 
entering into any society, makes him a perfect member of that society, a subject of 
that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, 
and how far it binds—i.e., how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, 
and thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no expressions of it 
at all. (Locke, 2004: 69f.――italics added) 
 
The question here is indeed not of the intentional or ontological character of the 
collective action, but rather that of objective attribution, where we, the society 
concerned, find a consensus or common sense, prior to the collective decision and 
action in question, namely how a rational, normal person understands the situation, 
and how far we shall be bound to the dominant society setting. We do not have any 
universal criterion of tacit consent, nor is its meaning reducible to actor’s mind. But 
still we refer to member’s consent to show the legitimacy of order, group, collective 
action, sometimes also misusing and disguising an individual consent. 
 
4. On collective negligence 
Finally, I want to examine the case of collective negligence as a type of specious 
zombie action. Zombie-like decision making through implied consents is not the case 
specific to a high context culture. It is rather a standard sociological view that social 
action occurs on the ground of “complementarity of expectations” among contributors, 
although expectations with regard to each other’s action is not identical (Parsons and 
Shils 1951:15; Kimura 2018a).  
Actors expect, presuppose and preoccupy others’ future action reciprocally. And 
as far as such an expectation is a sort of project toward others mind and uncertain 
future state of affairs, it can be always already erroneous. Hence, unintended phases 
and results of one’s own action can yield acts of negligence. 
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There are a lot of previous discussions and different standpoints on this issue in 
the field of criminology. Instead of going into them, I will refer to a phenomenological 
theory of action developed by Alfred Schutz, and propose an interpretation of 
collective negligence consistent with the subjective individualist approach (Schutz 
1962; Kimura 2012, 2013, 2014). 
Just as in an intended crime, a co-principal in a negligence case requires a 
consensual collective conduct, a crime result, and an adequate causal relationship 
between these. But as far as a negligence refers to an unintended result, how is it 
possible that participants have conspired consensus about unexpected results prior to 
their conduct? 
Amongst the phenomenologists, Alfred Schutz has tackled with the theory of 
social action and its motivation. Criticizing Weber’s notion of meaning, he 
understands action intention in two volitional components: project and fiat. (Schutz 
1962: 67) 
Project is an imaginary rehearsal of state of affairs to be realized by actors own 
action and it takes on the future perfect tense. Fiat is originally Latin imperative, 
meaning “let it be done,” and it would transform a project into an actual purpose of 
action. Hence, a project without fiat remains mere fancy. 
Action in a full fledge sense brings together of these two intentional features in 
Schutzian terminology. Worthy of special mention here is the difference of satisfaction 
conditions of these two. A project of act anticipates future results which are expected 
to be realized by own action in the future, and if this action fails to realize projected 
state of affairs, intentional action in this aspect is not fulfilled. A fiat is, on the other, 
satisfied as far as certain action was committed.  
While a projective belief is fulfilled by real occurrences of the state of affairs in 
mind, a fiat is fulfilled by committing a conduct. So the latter, the fiat intentionality 
comes into existence also in an erroneous action. 
The standard explanation of negligence in the contemporary criminology shares 
the same logic. As I have argued in another opportunity (Kimura 2013), Werner Niese 
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established this strategy of the finalist approach (Niese 1951), succeeding Hans Welzel, 
a leading criminological action theorist in 1930’s under Alexandar Pfänder’s influence. 
(Welzel 1931) 
Even if a perpetrator didn’t aim for the crime result in question (e.g. car accident), 
the person cannot be discharged as far as the result is foreseeable from the committed 
act such as a dangerously fast drive, and also avoidable from a viewpoint of a rational 
man. A fault then consists in a breach of objective due care, namely what Welzel calls 
“die im Verkehr erforderliche Sorgfalt (the care required in our social lives).” (Welzel 
1969:127ff.; s.a. Fukuda 1964: 109 and n.6) 
So even when we attempted just to take a drive, a following accidental event and 
victim’s survive or death could change the meaning of our action. Project is an 
end-in-view, which anticipates a future act, and therefore will be influenced by 
antecedent changes happened in action environment. The status of act, or act-token, 
also changes in accordance with antecedent events, which Alvin Goldman would call 
“causal action generation.” (Goldman 1970: 22) 
There are also other types of generation including a conventional type and 
possibility of re-describing an identical action. Giving chocolate on the specific date 
can mean love declaration in Japan. 
A contributor to collective action has a different range of ignorance and intention. 
And this range extends from non-purposive knowing, recklessness to willful blindness, 
as is shown in the standard criminological understanding in mens rea structure of an 
individual crime case. 
Pseudo zombie is haunting again this concurrent negligence of collective actors, 
in which every contributor says, “I didn’t intend it.” 
However, I think it proves out now that this specious zombiac intentionality of 
the collective negligence has indeed its ground on the perpetrators individual 
volitional risky attempt and intended omission of reasonable due care. 
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Note 
1 An earlier draft of the paper was presented at an international workshop on 
“Comparative phenomenology of facial and corporeal expressions” held at 
Kokugakuin University, March 4, 2019. 
2 See also Kimura 2018a and 2018b. 
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